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Abstract—The advent of conference mobile call demands the 
security communication between end users. However, 
currently there is no efficient secure end-to-end protocol exists 
for conference mobile call. This slows down the steps of 
conference communication. In this paper a secure end-to-end 
protocol for remote conference is designed base on previous 
experts work, which is one-to-one end-to-end protocol. In 
addition, security analysis from perspectives of confidentiality, 
authenticity, anonymity, freshness as well as preventing from 
denial of service (DoS) attack on the protocol is made. At the 
end, the efficiency of this protocol is discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Conference mobile call is getting popular in many 
companies. Instead of gathering together in a conference 
room, people can launch meetings through mobile devices. It 
makes conference possible wherever people are and creates 
more profits. Despite the convenience of it, not much 
concern is paid on the security of the conference mobile call. 
In the year 1996, Yi Mu and Vijay Varadharajan Vijay 
introduced a secure end-to-end protocol based on BCY and 
Carlsen’s authentication protocols which are published in 
1993 and 1994 respectively[1]. It can be used for one-to-one 
secure mobile device communication by both symmetric and 
asymmetric key based secure end-to-end protocols. 
However, an end-to-end protocol that supports conference 
mobile call has not been designed. In this paper, a secure 
end-to-end protocol for conference mobile call based on Yi’s 
protocol is introduced together with the analysis of it. It 
enables members in remote conference communicate 
securely. 
II. NOTATION USED
There are some notations used in the protocol and these 
notations are listed as follows. 
1. A, B, C : end users A, B, C 
2. As, Bs, Cs: subliminal ID of user A, B and C 
3. As’: new subliminal ID of A 
4. AS1,AS2,AS3: authentication server 1, 2 and 3 
5. A->B: A sends message to B 
6. [Data]key: Encrypting the data with a key 
7. h(…): a strong one way hash function 
8. Ks: session key between A, B and C 
9. nA: a nonce generated by A 
10. KAS1AS2: shared key between authentication server 
AS1 and AS2 
11. f(data): a function that generates key according to the 
data  
III. PROTOCOL 
According to Yi and Vijay’s symmetric key base end-to-
end  protocol. In the first two steps, A requests to get 
authenticated herself from home authentication server (HAS) 
through home server (HS) and generates a nonce which is 
used for identify the session between. Then a session key 
with B, KAB, is generated in step three after HAS’s 
successful verification on the A’s identity. At the same time, 
HAS gives A a subliminal ID from further request. In the 
step four and five, the KAB will be delivered to A under the 
encryption of shared key between A and HAS. After A gets 
the message, she will response HAS that she has got the 
message. HAS sends the same KAB together with the nonce 
generated by A and a subliminal ID of B to B under the 
encryption of shared key between HAS and B in step six. B 
then responses HAS that he has got the message in step 
seven.  After A and B decrypt the messages from HAS 
which contain the share key between them, they can 
communicate with each other securely based on this 
protocol.[1] 
Figure 1. Communication Scenario
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However, this protocol cannot migrate to conference 
secure communication because of its limitation of 
authentication.  Therefore, a protocol for conference mobile 
call which can be used in the scenario given in Figure 1 is 
introduced. As shown in Figure1, end user A is registered to 
AS1, B is registered to AS2 and C is registered to AS3. B 
moves to the AS1’s domain and this domain regards B as a 
visitor. Assuming that A will launch a conference call and he 
wants to set up a secure end-to-end communication between 
A, B and C. 
The brief authentication steps of this figure is that A 
should first get authenticated from AS1, and then AS1 will 
send A's request to AS3 in order to inform AS3 that A want 
to talk to C. After A got the session key with C, he sends 
another request to tell AS1 that B is requested to be talked. 
Then AS1 will ask AS2 to authenticate end user B which is 
in to domain of AS1. 
We will have the protocol of setting up the 
communication as follows: 
Step1:A AS1:As,AS1,nA,[C]KAAS1,[h(As, AS1, nA, C)]KAAS1
Step2:AS1 AS3:AS1, AS3, nAS1, [A,As,C,nA,Ks]KAS1AS3, 
[h(AS1,AS3,nAS1, nA, A,As,C, Ks)]KAS1AS3
Step3:AS3 C:AS3, Cs, nAS3,[A, As, Cs ', C, nA, Ks]KCAS3, 
[h(AS3,Cs,nAS3,nA, A, As, C, Ks)]KCAS3
Step4:C AS3:Cs,AS3,nAS3,[h(Cs,AS3,nAS3,nA,A,C,Ks )]KCAS3 
Step5:AS3 AS1:AS3, AS1, nAS1,[Cs]KAS1AS2,[h(AS3,AS1,nAS1, 
n
A
, A, C, Cs, Ks)]KAS1AS3
Step6:AS1  A:AS1,As,[Ks,As,Cs]KAAS1,nA,[h(AS1,A,C,Cs,As,
As ',nA,Ks)]KAAS1 
Step7:A  AS1:AS1,nA',[As,A,B]KAAS1,[h(AS1,nA',A,As, 
B)]KAAS1 
Step8:AS1 AS2:AS1,AS2,nAS1',[A, As, nA ', B, Ks]KAS1AS2
,[h(AS1, AS2, nA ', nAS1', A, As, B, Ks)]KAS1AS2 
Step9:AS2 AS1:AS2,nAS1',[Bs,B,KBAS1]KAS1AS2, 
[h(AS2,nAS1',Bs,B)]KAS1AS2,[B,Bs’,A,As,nA ',Ks]KBAS2,[h(B,Bs ',A, 
As, nA ',Ks)]KBAS2
whereKBAS1 =  f(AS2,Bs,KBAS2) 
Step10:AS1 B: AS1, Bs, nAS1", [B,   Bs ',A,As,nA ',Ks]KBAS2, 
[h(B,Bs ',A,As,   nA ',Ks)]KBAS2 , [h(AS1,Bs,nAS1")]KBAS1
Step11:B AS1:Bs,AS1,nAS1",[h(Bs,AS1,nAS1")]KBAS1
Step12:B  A : Bs , As ,[message,nA ']Ks ,[h(Bs , As , 
message, nA ')]Ks
Step13:A C:As,Cs,nA",[message']Ks,[h(As,Cs,nA", 
message')]Ks
Step14:B AS1:AS1,Bs,[C]KBAS1,nB,[h(AS1,Bs,C,nB)]KBAS1,[B, 
Bs,nB]Ks,[h(B,Bs,nB)]Ks
Step15:AS1 AS3:AS1,AS3,[C,Bs]KAS1AS3,nAS1''',[h(AS1,AS3,C,
Bs,nAS1''')]KAS1AS3,[B,Bs,nB]Ks ,[h(B,Bs,nB )]Ks
Step16:AS3 C:AS3,Cs',[C,Cs'',nAS3']KCAS3,[h(AS3,C,Cs',Cs'',n
AS3')]KCAS3,[B,Bs,nB]Ks ,[h(B,Bs,nB)]Ks
Step17:C AS3:Cs',AS3,nAS3',[h(Cs',AS3,nAS3')]KCAS3,[C,Cs',B,
Bs,nB]Ks,[h(C,Cs',B,Bs,nB)]Ks
Step18:AS3 AS1:AS3,AS1,nAS1''',[h(AS3,AS1,nAS1''')]KAS1AS3,[C,
Cs',B,Bs,nB]Ks ,[h(C,Cs',B,Bs,nB)]Ks
Step19:AS1 B:AS1,Bs,nB,[h(AS1, Bs,nB)]KBAS1,[C,Cs',B,Bs, 
nB]Ks,[h(C,Cs',B,Bs,nB)]Ks 
Step20:B C:Bs,Cs',[message'',nB']Ks,[h(Bs,Cs',message'',  nB
')]Ks 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
A. Confidentiality 
In order to ensure the confidentiality of the 
communication, checksum is used in the protocol. The 
message sent to the destination is first hashed using a strong 
one why hash function, for instance, MD5, CRC32, SHA-1 
etc. However, a hash value can be forged by an attacker who 
launches the man-in-the-middle attack or brute force 
attack[2]. Therefore, the hash value is then encrypted using 
the share key between the sender and the receiver. When the 
destination end gets that message, it can decrypt the message 
and get the hash value. Then, it composites all the elements 
except the encrypted hash value from the sender into a string 
and hash that string using the corresponding hash algorithm. 
The hash value got from the destination machine is 
compared with the value from decryption. If these two 
values are equivalent, then the receiver can make sure that 
the message is not forged or modified. 
B.  Authenticity 
When it comes to authentication, there are two scenarios. 
The first one is the end user stay at the domain of his or her 
home authentication server (HAS) domain. The other one is 
the end user who is registered with his or her HAS domain 
moves to VAS (visitor authenticate server). 
In the first scenario, as can be seen in the step1 A sends 
the message [C]KAAS1 and [h(As,AS1,nA,C)]KAAS1 to 
AS1. At the same time, AS1 gets A’s subliminal ID, As, as 
well. It will match As with A’s real ID, and then find out the 
share key between A and itself. Then this share key is used 
to decrypted [C]KAAS1 and [h(As,AS1,nA,C)]KAAS1. A 
successful decryption can make AS1 sure that it is talking to 
A. However, if AS1 cannot decrypt the message, then it will 
reject the request of the sender. AS1 can also record the IP 
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address of the sender. If the same IP address causes more 
three times failed attempt, the AS1 will block the IP address 
for a period of time to protect the shared key from being 
compromised from brute force attack. 
When it comes to the second scenario which is the end 
user migrating to a VAS, the authentication method turns to 
be a little complex.  In the protocol, B, which is registered to 
the AS2, moves to AS1. And as can be seen in figure 1, AS1 
is B’s VAS.  B has to get authenticated from AS2 and AS1 is 
used as a media between B and AS2. In the protocol, step 7, 
8, 9, 10 and 11 do the authentication for B. A firstly sends 
the AS1 the request of communicating to B. Then AS1 sends 
this request to AS2.  When AS2 gets this request from B, it 
will give AS1 a message containing a token, [B, Bs ', A, As, 
nA', Ks]KBAS2, which is encrypted under KBAS2 and a 
message containing KBAS1 which can be decrypted using 
the share key between AS1 and AS2. AS1 then sends the 
token to B, but AS1 itself has no able to get the information 
inside of the token. This protects the communication 
between AS2 and B. After B receiving the message from 
AS1, it can calculate the shared key between AS1 and itself. 
Because B knows AS2, Bs, KBAS2 and the mobile device 
can calculate the where KBAS1 f(AS2,Bs,KBAS2).  This 
key can be used to ensure the confidentiality of the message 
from AS1. If B can decrypt the token, then B is 
authenticated.  
C.  Anonymity 
In order to protect end users’ actual identity, subliminal 
ID is used in the protocol.The real identity is stored in the 
AS. When the end AS receives the subliminal ID from the 
end user, it will match the subliminal ID with the actual ID 
in its database. 
A subliminal ID creates a subliminal channel between the 
sender and the receiver and prevents the sender’s private 
information from being exposed to the public[3]. A man-in-
the-middle attack can intercept the identity of the end user 
and know the identity of the end user.  
After the end user being authenticated, a new subliminal 
ID for the corresponding end user is sent back. Then the end 
user’s mobile device can record this subliminal ID for future 
usage. This can ensure no same subliminal ID is used for the 
same end user. In the protocol given above, the new 
subliminal ID As’ is encrypted under the shared key between 
A and AS1. This can guarantee that only A can decrypt this 
message and record this new subliminal ID.  
D.  Freshness 
nonce is used in the protocol for freshness. The nonce is 
a non-repeat number. It can be used for preventing   the 
server from replay attack. How to make the nonce 
unpredictable is significant for freshness[4]. 
A new replay attack against Tor, which is a real-world, 
circuit-based low latency anonymous communication 
network, is introduced in 2008. And the countermeasure 
given is to monitor duplicate cells. [5] The nonce in the 
protocol, for instance nA, can uniquely identify a session 
between the sender and the receiver, so this end-to-end 
protocol is secure from replay attack.  
E.  Preventing from DoS attack 
The Denial of Service(DoS) attack from in the home 
domain is easy to prevent. If the authentication failed, the 
HAS can just reject the connection and free the memory. If a 
same IP continuously send request to HAS, the HAS can 
simply block that IP address. Liu X, Yang X and Lu Y 
introduced a filter-based DoS defence system called StopIt in 
2008, which is a very efficient measure of preventing from 
DoS attack[6].  
However, if a user goes to a VAS and he or she wants 
launch a conference call first. The VAS is vulnerable from 
DoS attack. Because, VAS cannot confirm the sender’s 
identity before sending that request to the sender’s HAS. The 
solution to this defect is to authenticate the sender 
automatically when the sender goes to a VAS domain. In this 
way, the sender’s authentication information can be migrated 
from HAS’s database to VAS’ database. Because VAS and 
HAS trust each other and they have a share key for 
communication between them. So the customers’ 
authentication information is secure. After the data 
migration, VAS can authenticate sender’s identity without 
the sender’s home domain when the sender wants to launch a 
conference call first. What worth mentioning is that VAS 
should delete visitors’ authentication information after visitor 
leaves VAS domain to decrease rate of loss if VAS’s 
database is compromised. 
V. EFFICIENCY
The end-to-end protocol for conference call introduce in 
this paper has high efficiency. Hash function is used for 
generating checksum. If cells in message are simply 
concatenated and then encrypted under encryption 
algorithms, it brings great burden to the encryption 
algorithms like AES, DES etc. There are many different 
problems of hashing such as Dynamic hashing, 
Cryptographic hashing, Geometric hashing, Robust hashing, 
Bloom hash, String hashing[7]. Which algorithm is to be 
used in the protocol depends on the time and security 
requests from companies. Because of the variation of request 
and condition, simulation used for comparing efficiency on 
this protocol hasn’t been done. That means there is no best 
algorithm, but the most suitable for a specific company 
depends on its business request. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The end-to-end protocol for conference mobile call 
introduced in this paper can ensure the secure 
communication between end users in difference AS domains. 
It protects end user’s private information and communication 
message. At the same time, authentication server can be 
protected from different kind of attacks. The analysis on the 
protocol makes a deeper exploration in the protocol from the 
aspects of confidentiality, authenticity, anonymity, freshness 
and preventing from DoS. 
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